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“The reality is sex offenders are a great political target. But that 
doesn’t mean any law under the sun is appropriate.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sex offender. This is an extremely consequential label, carrying with 
it a harsh—and often unjustified—stigma. Virgil McCranie certainly did 
not want this label.2 Virgil was 19 years old and his girlfriend Misty was 
14 years old when they first had sex.3 But later, Misty learned that Virgil 
1. Ryan Keith, Illinois Measure Would Move Some from Sex Offender List to New Registry,
DAILY CHRONICLE (June 24, 2006) (quoting then-Illinois-State-Representative John Fritchey), 
http://www.daily-chronicle.com/2006/06/19/measure-would-move-some-from-sex-offender-list-to-
new-registry/aqriqsz/news04.txt [https://perma.cc/ZN4R-D3QJ]. 
2. Bill Kaczor, Crist Delays Decision on Florida ‘Romeo-Juliet’ Case, SUN SENTINEL (June 
11, 2009), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/florida/sfl-romeo-juliet-sex-offender-061009-
story.html [https://perma.cc/29RR-D2MT].  
3. Id.
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had cheated on her, so she told her father that she had slept with Virgil.4 
Enraged, Misty’s father went to the police with this information; Virgil 
was subsequently charged with statutory rape.5 Because she was under the 
age of consent at the time she and Virgil had sex, Misty could not have 
legally consented.6 Although he ultimately avoided prison, Virgil 
agreed to a plea deal that required him to register as a sex offender.7 
Virgil and Misty eventually reconciled, married, and had children 
together.8 Virgil even received a pardon and is no longer registered as a 
sex offender.9 But the stigma associated with his sex-offender status 
followed Virgil for many years. He testified to the Florida Board of 
Executive Clemency that he had lost 17 jobs solely because of his sex-
offender status.10 Before he was pardoned, Virgil’s name, address, 
picture, a map identifying where he lived, vehicle description, and license 
plate number were all posted on the state’s publicly accessible sex 
offender website.11 Yet, Virgil had never been charged with any other 
crimes.12 He was never found guilty, nor did he plead guilty to a sex 
offense.13 But because he was required to register as a sex offender, Virgil 
had to live with the onerous stigma of his sex-offender label—a stigma 
that his children also had to experience. On a daily basis, Virgil had to live 
with the harsh consequences—consequences bearing a striking 
resemblance to punishment—that accompanied his sex-offender label.14 
When Virgil was required to register in 1994, sex offender 
registration laws were in their infancy. The registration and notification 
requirements imposed upon individuals like Virgil would expand 
significantly in the years that followed. As the United States Congress 
passed subsequent sex offender registration legislation, state legislatures 
followed suit, placing increasingly expansive restrictions on sex 
offenders. These registration and notification laws applied not only to 
4. Id. 
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. The prosecutor agreed to drop the charge of rape in exchange for Virgil’s plea of no contest 
to the charge of lewd and lascivious behavior. Id.  
8. Id.
9. Chanakya Sethi, The Ridiculous Laws that Put People on the Sex Offender List, SLATE 
(Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/08/
mapped_sex_offender_registry_laws_on_ statutory_rape_public_urination_and.html
[https://perma.cc/4FTC-5YXT].  
10. Kaczor, supra note 2. 
11. Id. 
12. Id.
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
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those who committed sex offenses after the states adopted these more 
expansive restrictions, but also to those who committed sex offenses 
before the states adopted them. 
When Megan’s Law (the federal Act that required the release of sex 
offender registration data to the public) passed the United States House of 
Representatives, several congressmen expressed concern over the 
constitutionality of certain provisions of the law.15 They feared that the 
regulatory scheme that was in place to monitor sex offenders would be 
susceptible to ex post facto constitutional challenges on the grounds that 
these laws, although intended to be civil and regulatory, actually 
prescribed retroactive punishment.16 These congressmen were particularly 
concerned that sex offender registration laws would subject released sex 
offenders to further punishment in the form of threats and discrimination, 
which would surely be directed at individuals publicly known to be “sex 
offenders.”17 The congressmen feared that future sex offender registration 
legislation could cross the line that divides regulatory laws from punitive 
laws, so they admonished Congress to exercise caution when considering 
future sex offender legislation proposals.18 
Upon signing Megan’s Law, President Clinton was asked if he was 
concerned that the federal courts would conclude that Megan’s Law 
effectively retroactively punished sex offenders in violation of the Ex Post 
Facto Clause.19 President Clinton said he was confident the law was 
constitutional and would be upheld by the federal district courts, appellate 
courts, and, if necessary, the Supreme Court.20 And he was right. Indeed, 
not only was the President correct that Megan’s Law would be upheld as 
constitutional by all of the federal courts—including the Supreme 
Court21—but subsequent sex offender laws would also be upheld in all of 
the federal circuit courts. 
State sex offender registration laws seemed immune to ex post facto 
constitutional challenges in the federal courts, even as those laws placed 
increasingly burdensome restrictions on released sex offenders.22 The 
15. Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-105, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (codified at § 42 USC 13071
(2012)); H.R. REP. NO. 104-555, at 9 (1996) (Congressmen Rick Boucher, Bobby Scott, Melvin L. 
Watt, and John Conyer’s, Jr. expressed their additional views on Megan’s Law in the House Report 
on the bill). 
16. H.R. REP. NO. 104-555, at 9 (1996). 
17. Id.
18. Id. at 10. 
19. See Remarks on Signing Megan’s Law and Exchange with Reporters, 32 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 877-78 (May 17, 1996). 
20. See id. at 878. 
21. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
22. See infra note 32; see also discussion infra Part II.A, II.C.
4
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courts consistently gave great deference to the legislatures when deciding 
if these laws were in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. They reasoned 
that as long as a rational connection existed between the law and the non-
punitive purpose for which it was enacted—safeguarding the public from 
sexual violence—then the law was constitutional. The reviewing courts 
structured their analyses on the premise that sex offenders recidivate at 
alarmingly high rates; this was the problem the legislatures sought to 
remedy. The legislatures believed that rigorous restrictions on sex 
offenders would deter them from committing sex offenses in the future, 
and thereby promote public safety. Based on these premises, it was not 
difficult for the federal courts to find a rational connection between the 
sex offender registration laws and the non-punitive purpose of protecting 
the public from sexual violence. 
However, in Doe v. Snyder, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
questioned the very premises upon which all the previous federal courts 
based their analyses.23 The problem identified by Congress and state 
legislatures (including Michigan’s)24 as the justification for enacting sex 
offender registration and notification laws—alarmingly high rates of 
recidivism—simply does not exist. Some sex offenders recidivate, but 
only a small percentage of them do so.25 Further, research has shown that 
registration and notification laws do not serve their intended purpose of 
recidivism reduction.26 In fact, recent data shows that, contrary to their 
expressed purpose, sex offender registration and notification laws can 
even increase recidivism rates.27 Thus, the Snyder court memorialized 
these findings in its opinion, concluding that 1) recidivism rates of sex 
offenders are not, in fact, nearly as high as they have been portrayed to 
be, and 2) that many of the restrictions placed on sex offenders may 
actually increase recidivism rates of sex offenders.28 This is not to say that 
even one instance of recidivism does not pose a problem to be addressed.29 
23. Doe v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016). 
24. Id. at 704 (“It’s professed purpose is to deter recidivism.”).
25. See infra Part V.C (reviewing empirical data on sex offender recidivism and concluding
that sex offender recidivism rates are actually much lower than they are commonly perceived to be). 
26. See infra Part VI.B (explaining that empirical data on the impacts of registration and
notification laws shows that such restrictions do not reduce recidivism). 
27. See infra Part VI.B.
28. See Snyder, 834 F.3d at 704-05. 
29. In an October 31, 2006 phone interview with Human Rights Watch, Dr. Jill Levenson said, 
“[s]exual violence is a serious problem, and any recidivism rate is too high. But recidivism rates for 
sex offenders are not as high as politicians have quoted in their attempts to justify the need for overly 
harsh sex offender laws.” Dr. Levenson is a professor of Human Services at Lynn University and a 
national expert on sex offender management. No Easy Answers, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 11, 
2007), https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/09/11/no-easy-answers/sex-offender-laws-us#730a8b 
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But that problem must be accurately identified, and the solution must be 
appropriately tailored to solve that problem. The Michigan legislature, 
like many other state legislatures across the United States, did not identify 
the problem correctly, nor did it tailor its remedy in a way that would 
address that problem. Instead, the Michigan legislature identified a non-
existent problem—extremely high recidivism rates—and attempted to 
remedy that problem with an ineffective solution—expansive, offense-
based reporting and notification requirements. 
This Article examines the Sixth Circuit’s recent Doe v. Snyder 
decision and argues that the Snyder court correctly found Michigan’s Sex 
Offender Registration Laws unconstitutional, in part because the court 
questioned certain assumptions upon which the validity of sex offender 
registration laws rest. Part II of this Article examines the enactment, 
evolution, and expansion of sex offender registration laws in this country. 
Part III examines how the Sixth Circuit became the first federal appellate 
court to find substantial provisions of a sex offender registration law 
unconstitutional on ex post facto grounds. Specifically, this section details 
how the court questioned both the assumption that sex offenders 
recidivate at alarmingly high rates and the assumption that sex offender 
registration laws reduce recidivism. 
Part IV frames the arguments that the rest of this Article discusses 
by questioning whether a rational relationship exists between sex offender 
registration requirements and the non-punitive purpose of deterring 
recidivism. Part V reviews the systematic, gross mischaracterization of 
sex offender recidivism rates; contrary to popular opinion, sex offenders 
recidivate at very low rates. This section first examines the history of ex 
post facto challenges to sex offender registration laws in the federal 
courts, then argues that major Supreme Court cases misapplied recidivism 
data, and finally examines current recidivism data, which shows that sex 
offenders actually recidivate at very low rates. 
Next, Part VI explains that the conventional wisdom, which assumes 
that sex offender registration laws actually reduce recidivism, is wrong. 
Finally, Part VII concludes by urging the federal courts to align 
themselves with the Sixth Circuit by finding that similar sex offender 
registration laws are, in effect, punitive, and therefore violate the Ex Post 
Facto Clause of the Constitution. Once these courts accept that sex 
offender registration laws do not reduce sex offender recidivism rates—
which, contrary to popular belief, are already very low—they will 
recognize that many of these laws, as currently constructed, are merely 
[https://perma.cc/T3MA-AGQ9].  
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punitive and provide little benefit to society. 
II. THE EFFECT OF SMITH V. DOE: STATE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
LAWS ARE VIEWED BY THE FEDERAL COURTS AS CONSTITUTIONAL, 
NON-PUNITIVE, CIVIL REGULATIONS 
Sex Offender Registration Acts, referred to as SORAs, have 
traditionally been regarded as regulatory laws that, while retroactive in 
their application, do not, in effect, prescribe criminal punishment.30 In the 
landmark case Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court ruled that Alaska’s 
SORA, which applied retroactively, was not in effect punitive and was, 
therefore, constitutional.31 Smith’s logic has since been followed by every 
federal circuit court.32 
A. Brief Overview of Sex Offender Registration Legislation 
To understand the context in which the Supreme Court’s Smith 
decision was made, it is first necessary to briefly review the history of sex 
offender registration laws. In 1994, the United States Congress passed the 
30. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
31. Id. at 105-06. 
32. See Shaw v. Patton, 823 F.3d 556 (10th  Cir. 2016) (holding that the reporting and residency 
requirements of Oklahoma’s SORA did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the requirements 
did not resemble traditional forms of punishment and were consistent with the non-punitive objective 
of protecting public safety); Riley v. Corbett, 622 F. App’x 93 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (holding 
that Pennsylvania’s SORA did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the SORA’s requirements 
were not, in effect, punitive); Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that New York’s 
SORA’s requirements were not in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause because they were not, in 
effect, punitive); King v. McCraw, 559 F. App’x 278 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that Texas’ SORA was 
not an Ex Post Facto Clause violation because it was not, in effect, punitive); United States v. 
Shannon, 511 F. App’x 487 (6th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the Defendant-Appellant’s claim that Ohio’s 
SORA was punitive in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause because the Defendant-Appellant failed 
to show that the SORA was, in effect, punitive); United States v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 
2013) (holding that the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act’s registration 
requirements were not in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause because they were not, in effect, 
punitive); ACLU v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046 (9th  Cir. 2012) (holding that Nevada’s SORA was not an 
Ex Post Facto Clause violation because it was not, in effect, punitive); United States v. Parks, 698 
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act’s 
requirements were not in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause because they were not, in effect, 
punitive); United States v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848 (11th  Cir. 2011) (holding that the judicial 
requirement that an inmate register as a convicted sex offender as a condition of his supervised release 
did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the registration requirements were not, in effect, 
punitive); Steward v. Folz, 190 F. App’x 476 (7th  Cir. 2006) (holding that the requirements of 
Indiana’s SORA were not punitive and, therefore, were not in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause); 
Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that Iowa’s SORA’s requirements were not in 
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause because they were not, in effect, punitive). 
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Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender 
Registration Act (Wetterling Act), which required states to create and 
maintain a non-public registry of persons convicted of sex offenses for the 
benefit of law enforcement.33 In 1996, Congress passed Megan’s Law, 
which amended the Wetterling Act to require public disclosure of 
information contained in sex offender registration databases.34 Congress 
further amended the Wetterling Act in 1996 to require, among other 
things, that certain serious sex offenders and recidivists register for life.35 
Notably, these SORAs were applied not only to persons who committed 
sex offenses after these laws were enacted, but also to persons who 
committed sex offenses before the SORAs were enacted.36 
The State of Alaska, like many other states, enacted its own SORA 
in 1994 pursuant to the Wetterling Act.37 Alaska’s SORA contained both 
registration and notification requirements and required sex offenders 
present in the state to register with local law enforcement within one day 
of their convictions or upon entering the state.38 The Alaska SORA 
required the sex offender to provide his name, address, an anticipated 
change of address, place of employment, date of birth, aliases used, 
identifying features, conviction information, driver’s license number, 
information about vehicles to which he had access, and post-conviction 
treatment history, among other things.39 With the exception of driver’s 
license information and an anticipated change of address, all of the above 
information was made public.40 Additionally, sex offenders convicted of 
aggravated sex offenses were required to register for life and verify their 
information quarterly.41 As with the federal registration requirements, 
Alaska’s SORA applied retroactively.42 
33. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 
1796 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2012)), repealed by Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety 
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, Title I, § 129(a), 120 Stat. 600. 
34. Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13701 
(2012)). 
35. See Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104–236, 110 Stat. 3093. 
36. Id.
37. ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.010 (Lawserver through 1994 legislation).
38. Id. § 12.63.010(a)(1), (a)(2). 
39. Id. STAT. § 12.63.010(b)(1). 
40. Id. STAT. § 12.63.010(b); ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.087(b) (Justia through 1994 legislation). 
41. ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.63.010(d)(2) (Lawserver through 1994 legislation), Id. § 
12.63.020(a)(1). ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.100 (Justia through 1994 legislation) defines “aggravated 
sex offense” to include, among other things, first- and second-degree sexual assault and first- and 
second-degree abuse of a minor. 
42. ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.010 (Lawserver through 1994 legislation). 
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B. The Smith v. Doe Ruling: Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration 
Statutes Created a Constitutional, Non-Punitive, Civil Regulatory 
Scheme 
The respondents in Smith were two sex offenders who had been 
convicted of sexual abuse of a minor—an aggravated sex offense.43 Both 
respondents were subjected to the above mentioned registration and 
notification requirements.44 The respondents challenged the 
constitutionality of Alaska’s SORA in the United States District Court for 
the District of Alaska, claiming that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause 
of Article 1, § 10 of the United States Constitution and the Due Process 
Clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.45 The district court granted 
summary judgment for the petitioners, the Alaskan government.46 On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, while the Alaska 
legislature had not intended the SORA to be punitive, the SORA 
nonetheless imposed punishment and was an unconstitutional ex post 
facto law.47 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately reversed 
in 2003, finding that Alaska’s SORA was a non-punitive civil regulation 
and was, therefore, constitutional.48 
To reach its conclusion, the Supreme Court engaged in a two-part 
analysis that has become the standard by which all ex post facto 
challenges to the constitutionality of SORAs are measured.49 First, the 
Court examined whether the legislature intended to create a punitive 
system of laws or a non-punitive civil regulatory scheme.50 Concluding 
that the legislature clearly intended to create a civil regulatory scheme, the 
Court moved on to the second part of the test, which examines whether 
“the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate 
the State’s intention to deem it civil.”51 Because legislative intent is 
ordinarily given great deference, a legislature’s stated intent can only be 
overcome by “the clearest proof” that a civil regulatory scheme is actually 
punitive in effect.52 To determine whether Alaska’s SORA was punitive 
in effect, the Court examined the five most-relevant factors established in 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, which query whether the regulatory 
43. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 91 (2003).
44. Id.
45. Id. 
46. Id.
47. Id. at 91-92. 
48. Id. at 105-06. 
49. Id. at 92. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 85. 
52. Id. 
9
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scheme: “[1] [has] been regarded in our history and traditions as a 
punishment; [2] impose[s] an affirmative disability or restraint; [3] 
promote[s] the traditional aims of punishment; [4] [has] a rational 
connection to a non-punitive purpose; or [5] [is] excessive with respect to 
this [non-punitive] purpose.”53 
With regard to whether the registration and notification requirements 
of Alaska’s SORA resembled historical and traditional punishment, the 
respondents argued that the SORA’s requirements—especially its public 
notification requirements—resembled early colonial public-shaming 
punishments.54 However, in response to this argument, the Court stated 
that “the stigma of Alaska’s [SORA] results not from public display for 
ridicule and shaming but from the dissemination of accurate information 
about a criminal record, most of which is already public.”55 While the 
Court acknowledged that publicity may cause adverse social 
consequences for a convicted sex offender, the Court pointed out that “the 
State does not make the publicity and the resulting stigma an integral part 
of the objective of the regulatory scheme.”56 
The Court also found that Alaska’s SORA did not impose an 
affirmative disability or restraint, in part because its restrictions did not 
resemble imprisonment, which the Court referred to as the “paradigmatic 
affirmative disability or restraint.”57 The Court further noted that the 
periodic updates required by the SORA did not have to be made in person 
and that persons subject to the conditions of Alaska’s SORA were free to 
move, live, and work wherever they wished with no supervision.58 The 
Court then acknowledged that Alaska’s SORA promoted some of the 
traditional aims of punishment, such as deterrence, but explained that “any 
number of governmental programs might deter crime without imposing 
punishment.”59 For this reason, this factor was given little weight.60 
The Court then examined the most heavily-weighted factor for this 
type of inquiry: whether the SORA had a rational relation to a non-
punitive purpose.61 The parties did not dispute that Alaska’s SORA had a 
legitimate, non-punitive, and rational purpose of “public safety, which is 
advanced by alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in their 
53. Id. at 97 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). 
54. Id.
55. Id. at 98. 
56. Id. at 99. 
57. Id. at 100. 
58. Id. at 101. 
59. Id. at 102. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
10
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communit[y].”62 However, the respondents argued that the SORA’s 
restrictions were not narrowly tailored to accomplish the purpose of 
protecting the public, pointing out that the SORA applied to all sex 
offenders without making any individual assessment of their future 
dangerousness.63 The Court first noted that “[a] statute is not deemed 
punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive 
aims it seeks to advance.”64 
The Court then addressed the first point regarding the universal 
application of Alaska’s SORA, explaining that it was rational for the 
Alaska legislature to conclude that a sex-offense conviction would be 
sufficient evidence of a “substantial risk of recidivism.”65 The Court 
stated that the Alaska legislature’s categorical conclusion was consistent 
with national concerns regarding the risk of recidivism of sex offenders—
a risk that the Court described as “‘frightening and high.’”66 Based upon 
its brief and generalized conclusion that sex offenders recidivate at 
alarmingly high rates, the Court concluded that “[t]he Ex Post Facto 
Clause does not preclude a State from making reasonable categorical 
judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular 
regulatory consequences.”67 
The respondents also argued that Alaska’s SORA was excessive in 
relation to its regulatory purpose because the public had easy, unrestricted 
access to the sex offender registry data.68 However, the Court quickly 
dismissed this argument by explaining that, while anyone could access the 
information, the dissemination of that data was passive—people had to 
look up the information to access it.69 The Court also found that Alaska’s 
SORA’s requirements were not excessive with regard to its non-punitive 
purpose, explaining that the inquiry under this factor was not whether the 
means chosen by Alaska’s legislature were the most prudent, but instead 
the inquiry was merely whether the means chosen were reasonable.70 The 
Court concluded that the regulatory scheme imposed by Alaska’s SORA 
was reasonable.71 
62. Id. at 103 (internal citations omitted). 
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002)). 
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 105. 
70. Id.
71. Id. at 105-06. 
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C. Post-Smith v. Doe Legislation and Jurisprudence 
In 2006—three years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith—
the United States Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and 
Safety Act (Walsh Act), which replaced much of the Wetterling Act by 
creating a more comprehensive sex offender registration and notification 
scheme.72 Among the expansive provisions of the Walsh Act were the 
requirements that sex offender registrants be divided into three tiers: tier 
one offenders are required to update their information yearly and must do 
so for 15 years; tier two offenders are required to update their information 
every 6 months and must do so for 25 years; and tier three offenders must 
update their information every three months and must do so for life.73 
While these categories relate to current dangerousness, they are not based 
on individual assessments; instead, these categorizations are based only 
on the offense committed.74 
Since the enactment of the Walsh Act and the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Smith, all of the federal circuit courts have heard ex post facto 
constitutional challenges to state SORAs and none of them have found 
that a state SORA’s requirements were punitive.75 None, that is, until Doe 
v. Snyder.76
III. THE DOE V. SNYDER COURT FOUND THAT MICHIGAN’S SEX
OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT WAS PUNITIVE AND, THEREFORE, 
VIOLATED THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE 
Like many other states, Michigan enacted a SORA pursuant to the 
Wetterling Act.77 Consistent with the nationwide trend, Michigan’s sex 
offender registration laws gradually grew and evolved.78 Although 
originally only a private tool for use by law enforcement, Michigan’s 
SORA was amended to require offenders to register in person, to make 
the registry available to the public, and to include pictures of sex 
offenders.79 In 2005, the SORA was amended to prohibit sex offenders 
72. 42 U.S.C. §16911 (2012). 
73. Id. The Walsh Act strongly encouraged states’ compliance with the federal regulatory
scheme by conditioning 10% of each state’s federal crime control funds under 42 U.S.C. § 3750 
(2012) on the states’ compliance with the new regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 16925 (2012). 
74. 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2012). 
75. See supra note 32. 
76. Doe v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016). 
77. 1994 Mich. Pub. Act 295 § 10 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.723 (2011)). 
78. 1999 Mich. Pub. Act 85 §§ 5a(4), 8(2), 10(2)(3); 2004 Mich. Pub. Acts 237, 238.
79. 1999 Mich. Pub. Act 85 §§ 5a(4), 8(2), 10(2)(3); 2004 Mich. Pub. Acts 237, 238. 
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from living, working, or loitering within 1,000 feet of a school.80 By 2011, 
the Michigan legislature added the requirement that sex offenders be 
divided into three tiers based not on any individualized assessment of their 
dangerousness, but on the severity of the crime they committed.81 
Consistent with the federal SORAs, Michigan’s SORA requirements 
applied retroactively.82 
Six individuals who were required to register as tier three sex 
offenders brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan, claiming, among other things, that Michigan’s 
SORA’s retroactive application to them was a violation of the Ex Post 
Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.83 The District Court found 
that the major provisions of Michigan’s SORA did not violate the Ex Post 
Facto Clause.84 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit devoted the bulk of its review to the 
issue of whether Michigan’s SORA was punitive in effect.85 Utilizing the 
five salient Mendoza-Martinez factors outlined in Smith, the Snyder court 
first found that Michigan’s SORA “inflict[ed] what has been regarded in 
our history and traditions as punishment[.]”86 In support of this finding, 
the Snyder court stated that the SORA resembled the ancient punishments 
of banishment, public shaming, and parole or probation.87 The court also 
found that Michigan’s SORA imposed an affirmative disability or 
restraint because it severely limited where registrants could live, work, 
and loiter—restrictions the court described as “direct restraints on 
personal conduct.”88 Further, the court found that the SORA’s restrictions 
advanced the traditional aims of punishment, but nonetheless gave this 
80. 2005 Mich. Pub. Acts 121, 127. 
81. 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts 17, 18.
82. 2006 Mich. Pub. Act 46; 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts 17, 18. 
83. Doe v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016). Plaintiffs argued that the impact of the
registration and notification requirements reached “far beyond the stigma of simply being identified 
as a sex offender on a public registry.” Plaintiffs explained that many of them have great difficulty 
finding jobs or homes where they can legally live or work due to the school zone restrictions; many 
of them who have children or grandchildren are barred from attending their children or 
grandchildren’s school plays or sporting events; all of the plaintiffs have to frequently report to law 
enforcement in person to update information regarding a change of residence, change of employment, 
change in status as a student, name changes, new email addresses or other internet identifiers, travel 
plans, or plans to buy or sell a vehicle. Id. at 698. 
84. Id. at 698-99. 
85. The Snyder court also examined whether the Michigan legislature intended to create a
punitive set of laws, but quickly determined that the legislature intended to create a civil regulatory 
scheme. Id. at 700-01. 
86. Id. at 701. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 703. 
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factor little weight because many civil regulations can also advance some 
of the traditional aims of punishment, such as deterrence.89 
The court then announced an unprecedented holding in the federal 
courts: Michigan’s SORA lacked a rational connection to the non-punitive 
purpose of public safety (which the Michigan legislature thought would 
be achieved by preventing sex-offenders from recidivating).90 The 
Supreme Court in Smith and other federal courts have accepted that 
recidivism rates of sex offenders are “‘frightening and high.’”91 Yet the 
Snyder court questioned that assumption, explaining that evidence in the 
record indicated that 1) sex offender recidivism rates are no higher than 
recidivism rates of other criminals (and may actually be lower than some 
other sorts of criminals), and 2) SORAs do not meaningfully reduce those 
recidivism rates.92 
In fact, one statistical analysis suggested that laws such as 
Michigan’s SORA actually increase the risk of recidivism, likely because 
the restrictions imposed by such laws exacerbate recidivism risk factors 
by making it extremely difficult for registrants to re-integrate into 
society.93 Thus, the “rational connection” between the registration and 
notification requirements of Michigan’s SORA and the legislature’s 
intended purpose of preventing sex-offender recidivism was presumed to 
be this: monitoring sex offenders at every turn of their lives would deter 
them from recidivating at such high rates.94 However, because empirical 
data in the appellate record contradicted this presumption, the registration 
and notification requirements of Michigan’s SORA could no longer be 
said to have a rational connection to a non-punitive purpose.95 
This conclusion that Michigan’s SORA lacked a rational connection 
to a non-punitive purpose demanded that the court also find that the SORA 
was excessive in relation to that purpose.96 It was clear that Michigan’s 
SORA imposed significant restrictions on sex offenders.97 But those 
significant restrictions were not counterbalanced by any proven positive 
89. Id. at 704. 
90. Id. at 704-05. 
91. Id. at 704 (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003)) (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 
U.S. 24, 34 (2002)). 
92. Id. at 704-05 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM 
OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 (2003)). 
93. J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Law Affect 
Criminal Behavior?, 54 J. L. & ECON. 161 (2011). 
94. Snyder, 834 F.3d at 704-05. 
95. Id.
96. Id. at 705. 
97. Id.
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effects—the restrictions did not deter recidivism.98 Thus, the Snyder court 
found that all five Mendoza-Martinez factors weighed in favor of a finding 
that Michigan’s SORA was, in effect, punitive.99 This placed the holding 
of Snyder squarely at odds with the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith.100 
However, the Snyder court distinguished the facts of this case from those 
in Smith by explaining that: 
[a] regulatory regime that severely restricts where people can live, work, 
and “loiter,” that categorizes them into tiers ostensibly corresponding to 
present dangerousness without any individualized assessment thereof, 
and that requires time-consuming and cumbersome in-person reporting, 
all supported by—at best—scant evidence that such restrictions serve 
the professed purpose of keeping Michigan communities safe, is some-
thing altogether different from and more troubling than Alaska’s first-
generation registry law.101 
It was on this basis that the Snyder court concluded that Michigan’s SORA 
was punitive in effect and was, therefore, a violation of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause. 
IV. IS THERE A RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPANSIVE SEX
OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AND THE 
PURPOSE OF DETERRING RECIDIVISM? 
The United States Constitution states that “[n]o State shall . . . pass 
any . . . ex post facto law.”102 Although not so limited in its express 
language, this clause has been accepted in American jurisprudence only 
as a prohibition against retroactive application of punitive laws, but not 
civil laws.103 James Madison described the prohibition of ex post facto 
laws as a “constitutional bulwark in favour of personal security and 
private rights.”104 Former Chief Justice John Marshall further explained 
that: 
[w]hatever respect might have been felt for the state sovereignties, it is 
not to be disguised that the framers of the constitution viewed, with 
some apprehension, the violent acts which might grow out of the feel-
ings of the moment; and that the people of the United States, in adopting 
98. Id.
99. Id. at 701-06. 
100.  Id. at 705-06. 
101.  Id. at 705. 
102.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
103.  Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 391 (1798). 
104.  ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JOHN JAY, & JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, 232 
(George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., The Gideon ed., Liberty Fund 2001). 
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that instrument, have manifested a determination to shield themselves 
and their property from the effects of those sudden and strong passions 
to which men are exposed.105 
Those “violent acts which might grow out of the feelings of the 
moment”—ex post facto laws—were described by former Supreme Court 
Justice Samuel Chase as “manifestly unjust and oppressive.”106 
The Supreme Court has also made it clear that the ex-post-facto 
nature of a law is determined not by its form, but by its effect.107 Stated 
differently, a law may be passed with the intent to create a retroactive civil 
regulatory scheme; this is constitutional.108 But if the effects of the law 
prove to be punitive, then the law will be considered a violation of the Ex 
Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.109 
As noted in Part II above, the Supreme Court has stated that the most 
important factor to the analysis of whether a law is punitive in effect is 
whether the statute bears a rational connection to the non-punitive purpose 
for which it was enacted.110 Time after time, petitioners in each of the 
federal circuit courts asserted that state SORAs lacked a rational 
connection to a non-punitive purpose.111 But prior to Snyder, the federal 
courts routinely dismissed these arguments, explaining that a SORA need 
not be “narrowly drawn to accomplish [its] stated purpose” to be 
rationally related to that purpose.112 The courts also explained that it is not 
their role to determine whether the legislatures chose the most prudent 
means to accomplish their goals; rather, the courts’ role is merely to 
determine whether those means were rational.113 However, inherent in the 
federal courts’ analyses of these arguments were two unquestioned 
assumptions. The first assumption was that recidivism rates of sex 
offenders were frighteningly high.114 The second assumption was that 
SORAs promote public safety by reducing recidivism.115 But what if these 
assumptions are incorrect? What if recidivism rates of sex offenders are 
not nearly as high as they are commonly believed to be? What if state 
SORAs actually increase recidivism rates of sex offenders, instead of 
105.  Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 137-38 (1810). 
106.  Id.; Calder, 3 U.S. at 391. 
107.  Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 31 (1981). 
108.  Id. 
109.  Id. at 32. 
110.  See supra Part II.B; Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102 (2003). 
111.  Smith, 538 U.S. at 103. 
112.  Id. 
113.  Id. 
114.  See supra note 66. 
115.  See supra notes 92-93. 
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decreasing those rates? Can state SORAs still be said to bear a rational 
connection to a non-punitive purpose? The Sixth Circuit said no. Other 
circuits should follow suit. 
V. EMPIRICAL STUDIES SHOW THAT, CONTRARY TO POPULAR BELIEF, 
THE RISK OF RECIDIVISM POSED BY SEX OFFENDERS IS NOT 
FRIGHTENINGLY HIGH 
Congress and state legislatures have asserted, in varying terms, that 
their purpose in enacting SORAs was to promote public safety by 
deterring recidivism of sex offenders.116 This purpose presupposes that 
sex offenders are likely to commit more sex offenses after they are 
released. Indeed, the Supreme Court pointed to the “frightening and high” 
rates of recidivism in Smith.117 Yet, as time passed and SORA restrictions 
expanded, the federal courts continued to rely on Smith, giving very little, 
if any, consideration to whether sex offender recidivism rates were 
actually as high as the Smith Court stated they were. However, recent 
studies have indicated that sex offender recidivism rates are much lower 
than the frighteningly high rates they have been portrayed to be.118 
A. The Federal Courts Have Not Questioned the Validity of the 
Assumption That Recidivism Rates of Sexual Offenders are 
“Frightening and High” 
In Riley v. Corbett, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals entertained a 
challenge to the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law.119 The 
petitioner, Riley, claimed that the application of Pennsylvania’s SORA to 
him violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because the SORA’s restrictions 
 116.  In Smith, the Court noted that the Alaska legislature “identified ‘protecting the public from 
sex offenders’ as the ‘primary governmental interest’ of the law.” Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93 
(2003) (internal citations omitted). In Snyder, the court noted that the Michigan legislature’s stated 
purpose for enacting its SORA was to “better assist law enforcement officers and the people of this 
state in preventing and protecting against the commission of future criminal sexual acts by convicted 
sex offenders.” Doe v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 700 (6th Cir. 2016). The stated purpose of the SORA 
in U.S. v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2012) was “to protect the public from sex offenders and 
offenders against children . . . [by] establish[ing] a comprehensive national system for the registration 
of those offenders.” 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2012).  
117.  Smith, 538 U.S. at 103 (internal quotations omitted). 
118.  See supra notes 92-93. 
 119.  Riley, the petitioner in this case, was convicted of adult rape in 1985. He was required to 
register as a sex offender after Pennsylvania passed its SORA in 1995. Because of the nature of his 
offense, he was required to register for life as a tier three sex offender. Riley v. Corbett, 622 F. App’x 
93, 94 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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were passed after he was convicted of his offense.120 The Riley court relied 
on the Supreme Court’s analysis in Smith to support its conclusion that 
the challenged provisions of Pennsylvania’s SORA were not materially 
different from those in Alaska’s SORA that were deemed non-punitive, 
and as a result, were not Ex Post Facto Clause violations.121 Notably, the 
court cited directly to language from Smith, stating that “[t]he [Alaska] 
legislature found that sex offenders pose a high risk of reoffending, and 
identified protecting the public from sex offenders as the primary 
governmental interest of the law.”122 The Third Circuit did not question 
whether this assertion regarding recidivism was still valid, nor did it make 
any statement regarding the Pennsylvania legislature’s view on sex 
offender recidivism rates.123 The Riley court simply accepted that 
recidivism rates of sex offenders were still as high as they were presumed 
to be when the Supreme Court decided Smith. 
Similarly, the Second Circuit has decided cases challenging the 
constitutionality of retroactively-applicable amendments to New York’s 
SORA without giving much more than a passing glance at recidivism rates 
of sex offenders.124 The Second Circuit, in support of its holding that New 
York’s SORA’s registration requirement amendments were regulatory 
and not punitive, stated that “registration . . . serves the general goal of 
protecting members of the public from the potential dangers posed by 
convicted sex offenders.”125 The court did not indicate in any way that the 
rates of recidivism of sex offenders were in question.126 To the contrary, 
the court’s acknowledgement of the “potential dangers posed by 
convicted sex offenders,” coupled with its reliance on the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Smith,127 indicate that the Second Circuit has also 
120.  Id.  
121.  Id.  
122.  Id. at 95 (emphasis added) (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 93). 
123.  Id. 
124.  The petitioner in this case pleaded guilty to one count of attempted possession of a sexual 
performance by a child and was required to register annually as a tier one sex offender for ten years. 
At the time of his sentence, New York’s SORA provided that “any sex offender required to register” 
could petition the sentencing court for relief. If relief was granted, the sex offender would no longer 
be required to register. Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2014). However, New York’s 
SORA was amended in 2006 so that it 1) required tier one sex offenders to register for a period of 20 
years, and 2) eliminated the ability of tier one sex offenders to petition for total relief from registration 
requirements. These amendments were applied to the petitioner, thereby eliminating his ability to 
petition for relief. Id. at 108-09. 
125.  Id. at 112 (emphasis added). 
126.  Id.   
127.  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99, 103-05 (2003) (finding, among other things, that recidivism 
rates of sex offenders were “frightening and high”).  
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accepted as fact the belief that sex offenders recidivate at high rates.128 
The First,129 Eighth,130 Tenth,131 and Eleventh Circuits132 have also 
followed Smith by accepting that recidivism rates of sex offenders are 
“frightening and high.” 
In King v. McCraw, the Fifth Circuit was even more explicit in its 
assertion that sex offenders are dangerous recidivists.133 The McCraw 
court cited to Smith in support of its conclusion that certain retroactively-
applicable amendments to Texas’ SORA were not punitive in fact, stating 
that the “‘duration of the reporting requirements is not excessive’ because 
research has shown that a child molester may commit a ‘re-offense’ as 
many as 20 years after being released.”134 Despite the fact that McCraw 
128.  Cuomo, 755 F.3d at 112.  
 129.  In United States v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1 (2012), the First Circuit aligned itself with Smith and 
all of the other circuits, finding that the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (the 
Walsh Act) was constitutional. The court did not focus individually on each of the Mendoza-Martinez 
factors; instead, the court compared the requirements of the Walsh Act to those of the Alaska statute 
in Smith. The court did not question whether recidivism rates of sex offenders were very high. In fact, 
the court did not even discuss that issue. By merely comparing the Walsh Act to the Alaska statute, 
the court implicitly assumed what the Smith Court explicitly stated—that recidivism rates are very 
high. Ultimately, the court found that, while the Walsh Act was slightly more burdensome than the 
Alaska statute (because it required sex offenders to register in person), it still was not punitive in 
effect. Id. 
130.  The Eighth Circuit ultimately rejected a constitutional challenge to a residency restriction 
in Iowa’s SORA, stating, “[i]n light of the high risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders, the [Iowa] 
legislature reasonably could conclude that § 692A.2A [the challenged residency restriction provision] 
would protect society by minimizing the risk of repeated sex offenses against minors.” Doe v. Miller, 
405 F.3d 700, 721 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). 
 131.  In Shaw v. Patton, the Tenth Circuit held that certain residency restrictions contained in 
Oklahoma’s SORA were not punitive, in part because the restrictions were rationally related to the 
non-punitive purpose of protecting the public from the dangers posed by sex offenders. 823 F.3d 556, 
574 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 132.  In United States v. W.B.H., the Eleventh Circuit found that the Walsh Act was not punitive 
in effect because it was rationally related to the non-punitive purpose of promoting public safety by 
restricting where sex offenders could live and work and by alerting the public as to their location. 664 
F.3d 848, 859 (11th Cir. 2011). The court made this determination by quickly comparing this case to 
Smith, which assumed that sex offenders recidivate at alarmingly high rates. Id.  
 133.  No sex offender registration legislation had been passed yet when the defendant, King, was 
charged with indecency with a child in 1990. King pleaded guilty, but was placed on deferred 
adjudication for indecency with a child and was placed on probation for ten years. A state court 
entered an order in 1996 terminating his probation and dismissing all proceedings against him. In 
1991, Texas enacted its SORA, but individuals who had been placed on deferred adjudication were 
not required to register under the law. However, in 2005, the Texas legislature amended its SORA to 
require individuals who had been placed on deferred adjudication any time after 1970 to register. 
King v. McCraw, 559 F. App’x 278, 279 (5th Cir. 2014). The court ultimately held that applying 
Texas’ SORA to King was not unconstitutional, as the requirements that King register and then re-
register annually were not punitive in effect. Id. at 282. 
 134.  Id. (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 104 (2003). See also infra Part V.B (explaining 
that this finding was from a study that is inapplicable to sex offenders as a whole and is inapplicable 
to all child molesters). 
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was decided 11 years after Smith, the McCraw court did not inquire further 
regarding more current recidivism data; instead, the court simply accepted 
the Supreme Court’s statement and moved on.135 
Prior to its decision in Snyder, the Sixth Circuit also accepted the 
“frightening and high” rates of sex offender recidivism. In Doe v. 
Bredesen, which involved a constitutional challenge to a portion of 
Tennessee’s SORA on ex post facto grounds, the court concluded that the 
recidivism statistics relied upon by the Tennessee legislature provided a 
rational basis for the legislature to conclude that sex offender recidivism 
rates were, in fact, very high.136 It followed, then, that the “stringent 
registration, reporting, and electronic surveillance requirements” of 
Tennessee’s SORA were reasonable, constitutional measures designed to 
prevent future offenses by these dangerous recidivists.137 The Tennessee 
law was also deemed to not be excessive in relation to its non-punitive 
purpose.138 
Thus, the Bredesen court ultimately reached a conclusion that was 
consistent with the other circuit courts’ rulings on this issue.139 The court 
135.  See King, 559 F. App’x at 279.  
 136.  Prior to 2004, the petitioner in this case was convicted of several offenses, including two 
counts of sexual battery. For this reason, he was classified as a “sexual offender” under the Tennessee 
law in effect at the time of his convictions. Under that law, ten years after a conviction, a sex offender 
could petition the circuit court for relief from registration. If the petition was granted, the individual 
would no longer be required to comply with the registration system; the individual’s sex offender 
status and files would be expunged. But in 2004, Tennessee repealed that law and passed a new set 
of sex offender registration and monitoring acts. These new laws retroactively classified the petitioner 
as a “violent sexual offender.” Violent sex offenders were required to register for life and could not 
petition for relief. Additionally, violent sex offenders were required to be monitored via satellite. Doe 
v. Bredesen, 507 F. 3d 998, 1000-01 (6th Cir. 2007). 
137.  On this point, the Bredesen court concluded that “the Tennessee General Assembly could
rationally conclude that sex offenders present an unusually high risk of recidivism.” Id. at 1006.  
 138.  Regarding the excessiveness of the Tennessee law with respect to its non-punitive purpose, 
the court first noted that it is not the duty of the court to determine whether the decision of the 
legislature was the most prudent. The court then explained that no basis existed to support a finding 
of excessiveness. Id.  
 139.  Citing to a number of other circuits, the Sixth Circuit paused to “note that our sister circuits 
have likewise consistently and repeatedly rejected ex post facto challenges to state statutes that 
retroactively require sex offenders convicted before their effective date to comply with similar 
registration, surveillance, or reporting requirements.” Id. at 1006-07 (citing to Weems v. Little Rock 
Police Dep’t, 453 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom. Weems v. Johnson, 550 U.S. 917 
(2007); Johnson v. Terhune, 184 F. App’x 622 (9th Cir. 2006); Steward v. Folz, 190 F. App’x 476 
(7th Cir. 2006); Kirschenhunter v. Sheriff’s Office, Beauregard Parish, 165 F. App’x 362, 363 (5th 
Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 913 (2006); Szczygiel v. Madelen, 116 F. App’x 224 (10th Cir. 
2004); Herrera v. Williams, 99 F. App’x 188 (10th Cir. 2004); Moore v. Avoyelles Corr. Ctr., 253 
F.3d 870 (5th Cir. 2001); Burr v. Snider, 234 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 2000); Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 
1244 (10th Cir. 2000); Roe v. Office of Adult Prob., 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997); and Doe v. Pataki, 
120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
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accepted the view that recidivism rates were high. However, unlike the 
other circuits that simply assumed recidivism rates were high, the 
Bredesen court acknowledged that this assumption could be challenged. 
The court stated “[i]n view of United States Department of Justice 
statistics cited in the [Tennessee] Registration Act’s preamble, the 
accuracy and relevance of which have not been contested by [the 
petitioner], the Tennessee General Assembly could rationally conclude 
that sex offenders present an unusually high risk of recidivism.”140 But the 
petitioner in this case did not challenge this assumption, and his ex post 
facto challenge failed. However, the Sixth Circuit, by noting that 
recidivism rates were not challenged, identified a key area in which future 
ex-post-facto challenges to SORAs should focus. 
Still other circuits, even when presented with recidivism data 
indicating that sex offender recidivism rates may not be as frighteningly 
high as commonly supposed, have found ways to discredit the accuracy 
of that data or treat the data as irrelevant. In an opinion in which the 
Seventh Circuit ultimately rejected a challenge to Wisconsin’s SORA, 
Judge Posner essentially determined that Justice Department data on 
recidivism rates of sex offenders was inaccurate and inconclusive.141 
Judge Posner first cited to other studies estimating the reporting rates of 
sex offenses, from which he concluded that many sex offenses go 
unreported every year.142 He then examined Justice Department statistics 
regarding child molesters,143 acknowledged that only “39 percent [of child 
molesters] were rearrested . . . within three years,” and further admitted 
 140.  Bredesen, 507 F.3d at 1006 (emphasis added). The court later stated that “Doe provides no 
basis for us to conclude that the Act’s requirements are excessive in relation to its legitimate, 
nonpunitive purpose of protecting the public from the undisputed high rate of recidivism.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 141.  The plaintiff-appellee in this case, Belleau, was convicted in the early 1990s of molesting 
multiple children. After release from prison, he was civilly committed in 2004 because he was deemed 
a “sexually violent person” as defined by Wisconsin law. In 2006, Wisconsin passed a law requiring, 
among other things, that persons released from civil commitment for sexual offenses wear a GPS 
monitoring device 24 hours a day for the rest of their lives. WIS. STAT. § 301.48 (2006). Belleau was 
therefore required to wear a GPS monitor for the rest of his life. However, he challenged the validity 
of that statute, claiming, among other things, that it prescribed ex post facto punishment. Belleau v. 
Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 931 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 142.  Id. at 933 (citing to two studies on sex offense reporting: one in which it was estimated that 
70% of child sexual assaults reported in interviews had not been reported to the police (DAVID 
FINKELHOR ET AL., JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN, SEXUALLY ASSAULTED CHILDREN: NAT’L 
ESTIMATES & CHARACTERISTICS 8 (2008)); and another estimating that 86% of sex crimes against 
adolescents go unreported to the police (U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 
YOUTH VICTIMIZATION: PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS 6 (2003))). 
 143.  Judge Posner examined recidivism data on child molesters because the plaintiff-appellee 
in this case, Belleau, was previously convicted of molesting a child. Belleau, 811 F.3d at 930-33. 
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that this is a much lower re-arrest rate than that of non-sex offenders 
(68%).144 Judge Posner also acknowledged that, of those 39% of child 
molesters that were re-arrested, only 3% of them were arrested for 
subsequent molestations.145 
Child molestations are precisely the kind of sex offenses that SORAs 
were created to prevent. Indeed, these types of crimes were the primary 
catalyst for such laws.146 But the desire to prevent people from becoming 
victims of sex offenses, however noble it may be, should not cause the 
guardians of the Constitution—federal judges—to ignore the reality that 
sex offenders are not compulsive recidivists. Judge Posner stated that “the 
3 percent recidivism figure implies that as many as 15 percent of child 
molesters released from prison molest again.”147 Judge Posner then 
concluded that this “high” 15% recidivism rate—a rate found only 
through his own analysis, but not in any empirical study—was “further 
evidence of the compulsive nature of [child molesters’] criminal 
activity.”148 But even if Judge Posner’s calculation (based on estimates of 
under-reporting of sex offenses) of a 15% recidivism rate is assumed to 
be true, that rate is still significantly lower than the rates of recidivism 
traditionally identified by legislators and courts. This makes Judge 
Posner’s conclusion that child molesters compulsively recidivate at 
alarming rates particularly striking, especially in light of his well-known 
views on judicial decision-making. 
For decades, Judge Posner has been a champion of judicial decision-
making that is based on sound policy and the truth; he has consistently 
declined to reach decisions premised on assumption or tradition.149 He has 
adhered to a “style of legal analysis” premised on “a sure understanding 
of the scientific . . . complexities, factual rather than legal, out of which 
 144.  Id. at 934 (quoting RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994, 
supra note 92, at 17, table 10). 
145.  Id.  
 146.  See Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996); Jacob Wetterling Crimes 
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 
1796 (1994); and Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, Title 
I, § 129(a), 120 Stat. 600. 
147.  Belleau, 811 F.3d at 934. 
148.  Id. 
149.  See RICHARD POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 5 (2013), in which Judge Posner 
describes his judicial decision-making approach, stating: 
The realist places emphasis on the consequences of judicial rulings, and in that regard is 
pragmatic but only if the realist considers systemic as well as case-specific consequences 
and thus avoids shortsighted justice—justice responsive only to the “equities” of the par-
ticular case—and is analytical and empirical rather than merely intuitive and political. 
Judge Posner also described himself as “a pragmatic judge.” Id.  
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cases arise.”150 Judge Posner certainly engaged with the scientific data 
regarding recidivism rates of child molesters in Belleau.151  But he 
incorrectly applied that data. 
In Belleau, a psychologist reviewed Mr. Belleau’s case and found 
that he posed only an eight percent risk of re-offense.152 Yet (according to 
Judge Posner) this psychologist’s individualized assessment was not to be 
trusted; data on sex offenders as a class needed to be consulted.153 When 
that data provided an even lower recidivism rate, a new risk of recidivism 
was calculated for child molesters as a whole to prove that Mr. Belleau—
an individual who belonged to that whole—did, in fact, pose a significant 
danger to society.154 Judge Posner once wrote that judges like himself 
should “not draw a sharp line between law and policy . . . and between 
legal reasoning and common sense.”155 Yet common sense, informed by 
data, demands a conclusion that is at odds with Judge Posner’s: that not 
all child molesters are compulsive recidivists. Judge Posner fell prey to 
the same flawed reasoning that the public, the state legislatures, and other 
federal judges have been ensnared by: he assumed that all sex offenders 
were dangerous, compulsive recidivists. 
This unwillingness to accept that sex offender recidivism rates are 
low was further illustrated by the Ninth Circuit case ACLU v. Masto, in 
which the accuracy of the sex offender recidivism data relied upon by the 
Supreme Court in Smith was unsuccessfully challenged.156 Judge Trott, 
who authored the opinion, stated: 
Plaintiffs argue that Smith overstated the risk of sex-offender recidivism. 
They note that Smith cited several studies on sex offender recidivism. 
Plaintiffs then rely on an expert declaration critiquing the methodology 
of the recidivism studies in Smith. The district court did not make any 
factual finding regarding the risk of sex offender recidivism. Even had 
it adopted the declaration’s conclusions as its own, a recalibrated as-
sessment of recidivism risk would not refute the legitimate public safety 
150.  Id. at 4. 
151.  Belleau, 811 F.3d at 934. 
152.  Id. 
153.  Id.  
154.  Id. 
155.  See POSNER, supra note 149, at 120. 
156.  In ACLU v. Masto, the State of Nevada appealed the district court’s grant of injunctive 
relief to certain sex offenders enjoining the enforcement of two bills passed by the Nevada legislature: 
Assembly Bill 579, which expanded the scope of sex offender registration and notification 
requirements; and Senate Bill 471, which imposed residency and movement restrictions on certain 
sex offenders. 670 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2012). These bills were challenged in the district court 
on several constitutional grounds, including ex post facto grounds. Id. at 1051. 
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interest in monitoring sex-offender presence in the community.157 
But Judge Trott failed to explain why the legitimate public safety purpose 
of the law would not be refuted,158 even if recidivism rates were much 
lower than previously supposed.159 Based on Judge Trott’s statement, it is 
unclear what could possibly form the basis for a rational public safety 
purpose even if recidivism rates were, in fact, very low. Judge Trott’s 
logic here is questionable. A legitimate public safety interest in 
monitoring sex-offender presence in communities only exists if sex 
offenders are likely to recidivate. But if one assumes, for the sake of 
argument, that sex offenders are not likely to recidivate, and that they are 
in fact actually highly unlikely to recidivate, then the public safety interest 
in monitoring sex offenders no longer exists. To reach his decision, Judge 
Trott, like Judge Posner, subscribed to the myth that all sex offenders are 
dangerous recidivists. 
Thus, for a challenge to a state SORA to succeed on ex post facto 
grounds in front of federal judges such as Judge Posner or Judge Trott, it 
would seem that sex offender recidivism rates must be shown by every 
available study to sit at zero percent. This surely will not happen. But that 
does not mean that the widely-held perception of high sex offender 
recidivism rates cannot be challenged. On the contrary, recidivism rates 
can and should be challenged in the courts, especially in light of recent 
data on recidivism rates and the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Snyder. The 
federal courts must examine and apply actual, empirically-derived data on 
sex offenders; they must apply that data reasonably; and data focusing on 
a limited subgroup of sex offenders must not be construed as applicable 
to the whole. 
B. The Supreme Court Misapplied Recidivism Data in McKune v. Lile 
and Smith v. Doe 
The federal courts have relied on the Smith Court’s characterization 
of sex offender recidivism rates as “frightening and high” for years. But 
157.  Id. at 1057 (emphasis added). 
 158.  Judge Trott ended his analysis of the Nevada statute’s rational relation to a non-punitive 
purpose with the above-quoted statement and moved on to the next Mendoza-Martinez factor. No 
further explanation was given regarding why an extremely low recidivism rate would not remove a 
rational purpose of public safety. Id.  
159.  The expert for the plaintiffs in this case, Jill S. Levenson, Ph.D., explained that the statistics 
relied on in Smith were inaccurate and inapplicable to this case, and focused specifically on the study 
by the National Institute of Justice. Joint Answering Brief for Plaintiffs/Appellees at 26-27, ACLU v. 
Masto, 670 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 08-17471) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE, CHILD SEXUAL MOLESTATION: RESEARCH ISSUES 14 (1997)).  
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this phrase first appeared not in Smith, but in the 2002 case, McKune v. 
Lile.160 In McKune, the Court examined sex offender recidivism rates in 
the context of a claim that a sex offender treatment program for inmates 
violated the inmates’ right against self-incrimination.161 The McKune 
Court examined a number of statistics and reports on recidivism rates, 
several of which were also relied upon by the Court in Smith.162 However, 
these reports were misapplied then and should not be used to support the 
assertion that sex offender recidivism rates are “frightening and high.”163 
In McKune, Justice Kennedy referenced a 1988 Justice Department 
compendium titled “A Practitioner’s Guide to Treating the Incarcerated 
Male Sex Offender,” stating, “the rate of recidivism of untreated [sex] 
offenders has been estimated to be as high as 80%.”164 If that statistic was 
true, recidivism rates were indeed “frightening and high.” But that Justice 
Department guide, which is 231 pages long, cited numerous statistics on 
recidivism rates, many of which were very low—some were even in the 
single digits.165 And the one source that claimed an 80% recidivism rate 
was an article published in the mass-market magazine, Psychology 
Today.166 Incredibly, that statistic was unsupported by any empirical 
data.167 As one author aptly put it, “[t]hat’s it. The basis for much of 
American jurisprudence and legislation about sex offenders was rooted in 
an offhand and unsupported statement in a mass-market magazine, not a 
 160.  In McKune, an inmate imprisoned for a rape conviction at a Kansas correctional facility 
challenged the constitutionality of a sexual offender treatment program in which sex offenders were 
required to participate. As part of the treatment program, the inmates were required to admit guilt of 
criminal conduct, including uncharged offenses. If the inmates did not comply with this program, they 
lost privileges and freedoms and could be removed to harsher prison facilities. McKune v. Lile, 536 
U.S. 24, 29, 33 (2002).  
161.  Id. at 29. 
 162.  The Smith Court stated: “When convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much 
more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault.” Smith 
v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (quoting McKune, 536 U.S. at 33). This finding was derived from
two statistical reports: U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEX OFFENSES AND 
OFFENDERS 27 (1997) and U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF 
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 6 (1997). 
 163.  For a comprehensive review of the Supreme Court’s misuse of recidivism statistics in Smith 
and McKune, see Ira Mark Ellman & Tara Ellman, ‘Frightening and High’: The Supreme Court’s 
Crucial Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 495 (2015). 
 164.  McKune, 536 U.S. at 33 (citing NAT’L INST. CORR., A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO 
TREATING THE INCARCERATED MALE SEX OFFENDER 44, 64 (1988)). 
 165.  See generally NAT’L INST. CORR., A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO TREATING THE 
INCARCERATED MALE SEX OFFENDER (1988). 
 166.  See Robert E. Freeman-Longo & R. Wall, Changing a Lifetime of Sexual Crime, 
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Mar. 1986), at 58. 
167.  See id. 
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peer-reviewed journal.”168 
Moreover, some of the data the Supreme Court relied on in Smith has 
been increasingly questioned and criticized. To support its position that 
the challenged reporting requirements of the Alaska SORA were not 
excessive, the Supreme Court cited a United States Department of Justice 
study for the claim that sex offenders commit additional sex offenses as 
late as 20 years after release from prison.169 However, this finding was 
taken out of context. As explained by the expert for the plaintiff-sex-
offenders in ACLU v. Masto, there were multiple reasons why the use of 
this study as an aid for judges reviewing ex post facto challenges was 
improper. First, the study dealt only with child molesters, so it was 
inapplicable to the broader, more general category of “sex offenders.” 
Second, not only were the subjects of the study child molesters, but they 
were child molesters who had been civilly committed—a group with a 
much higher recidivism risk than those who had not been civilly 
committed. Third, recidivism rates of child molesters who had been 
treated and released were much lower than those that had been civilly 
committed. Lastly, the actual recidivism rates of the high-risk subjects of 
this study were much lower than the recidivism rates projected by the 
study.170 Yet these concerns did not stop the Smith Court from applying 
this narrow study to the broad category of sex offenders.171 
The only further support cited to by the Supreme Court in Smith 
regarding recidivism rates was one sentence from McKune stating that 
“[w]hen convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more 
likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or 
sexual assault.”172 While it is true that the report titled Recidivism of 
Prisoners Released in 1983 stated that released rapists were much more 
168.  Adam Liptak, Did the Supreme Court Base a Ruling on a Myth?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/us/politics/supreme-court-repeat-sex-
offenders.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/R8C4-74JA].  
169.  CHILD SEXUAL MOLESTATION: RESEARCH ISSUES, supra note 159, at 14. 
 170.  This analysis of the Prentky, R. Knight and A. Lee study was undertaken by Dr. Levenson, 
who was the expert for the plaintiff-sex-offenders in this case. Joint Answering Brief for 
Plaintiffs/Appellees at 27, ACLU v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 08-17471). It is also 
worth noting that the authors of this study, Prentky, Knight, and Lee, explicitly stated that “the 
obvious heterogeneity of sexual offenders precludes automatic generalization of the rates reported 
here to other samples.” CHILD SEXUAL MOLESTATION: RESEARCH ISSUES, supra note 159, at 656-57. 
 171.  With regard to whether the Alaska SORA was excessive, the Court—without citing to any 
other data on sex offender recidivism rates over time—found that lengthy reporting requirements were 
not excessive. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 104 (2003). 
 172.  The Court in McKune derived this finding from two studies: SEX OFFENSES AND 
OFFENDERS, supra note 162, at 27 and RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983, supra note 
162, at 6. 
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likely than other types of offenders to be rearrested for rape, this finding 
merely compares the likelihood of prior rapists committing another rape 
versus a non-rapist committing a rape—a finding that is immaterial to the 
actual frequency with which sex offenders as a whole commit additional 
sex offenses.173 Although the Recidivism 1983 report indicates that 36.4% 
of rapists and 32.6% of other sexual offenders were reconvicted for 
subsequent offenses,174 these rates are much lower than reconviction rates 
for many other types of offenders.175 Further—and most importantly—
these 36.4% and 32.6% reconviction rates represent convictions for any 
offense—not just reconviction for sexual offenses, indicating that 
reconviction rates for subsequent sex offenses are even lower.176 
The other study the Smith Court cited to as proof of “frightening and 
high” recidivism rates was Sex Offenses and Offenders (1997), which also 
contains findings that contradict the belief that sex offenders are such high 
recidivists.177 Additionally, a three-year Bureau of Justice Statistics 
follow-up study of released offenders on probation revealed that those 
with prior rape convictions had significantly lower felony and violent 
felony re-arrest rates than most other categories of probationers.178 
As the Supreme Court pointed out, both of these studies show that 
certain sub-groups of released sex offenders may commit subsequent sex 
offenses on a relatively more frequent basis than other types of released 
offenders. However, the Supreme Court failed to dig into the details of 
these studies, both of which show that sex offenders as a whole recidivate 
at very low rates. 
C. Empirical Studies Show That Recidivism Rates of Sex Offenders 
Are Very Low, Especially When Compared to Recidivism Rates of 
Other Types of Criminals 
Smith painted a dire picture of sex offender recidivism rates in the 
United States, and the public has generally accepted that sex offenders are 
173.  RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983, supra note 162, at 2. 
174.  Id. at 5, table 8. 
175.  Id. (indicating that the average reconviction rate is 46.8% for all offenses; 41.9% for violent 
offenses; 53% for property offenses; 35.3% for drug offenses; 41.5% for public order offenses; and 
62.9% for all other offenses). 
 176.  Id. at 2 (“Reconviction refers to a conviction on at least one charge after the date of release 
from prison.”). 
 177.  Id. at 26 (indicating that all violent offenders were reconvicted 42% of the time for 
subsequent offenses after release, which was a higher reconviction rate than both released rapists 
(36%) and released offenders convicted of other sexual assaults (33%)). 
 178.  Id. at 25-26 (finding that released rapists had re-arrest rates of 19%, while other released 
violent offenders were re-arrested at a rate of 41%). 
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compulsive recidivists.179 More importantly, (at least as it relates to the 
creation of sex offender registration laws) politicians have echoed that 
sentiment.180 But a more careful look at sex offender recidivism data 
paints a much different picture. This was the realization of Patty 
Wetterling, whose son, Jacob Wetterling, was abducted, sexually abused, 
and murdered as a young child in 1989.181 Patty Wetterling said: 
I based my support of broad-based community notification laws on my 
assumption that sex offenders have the highest recidivism rates of any 
criminal. But the high recidivism rates I assumed to be true do not exist. 
It has made me rethink the value of broad-based community notification 
laws, which operate on the assumption that most sex offenders are high-
risk dangers to the community they are released into.182 
This is a powerful statement. Very few people have more right to despise 
violent sex offenders than Patty Wetterling. Yet even she has been able to 
recognize that sex offender registration legislation has been built on a 
faulty foundation. As Dr. Jill Levenson said, “[s]exual violence is a 
serious problem, and any recidivism rate is too high. But recidivism rates 
for sex offenders are not as high as politicians have quoted in their 
attempts to justify the need for overly harsh sex offender laws.”183 
Indeed, many studies report much lower rates of recidivism. In two 
follow-up studies to those cited to in Smith, convicted rapists and other 
sex offenders were found to be some of the least likely criminals to 
 179.  Human Rights Watch reports that “[s]ex offender laws also reflect the assumption that 
previously convicted sex offenders are responsible for most sex crimes.” No Easy Answers, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 11, 2007), https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/09/11/no-easy-answers/sex-
offender-laws-us#730a8b [https://perma.cc/4JDP-HW38].  
 180.  Then-representative Jennifer Dunn (R-WA), speaking in support of Megan’s Law, stated 
that “the rate of recidivism for these crimes is astronomical because these people are compulsive. We 
know that.” 140 Cong. Rec. H 8414 (1994). Then-representative Mark Foley (R-FL), speaking in 
support of strengthened sex offender laws, stated “there is a 90 percent likelihood of recidivism for 
sexual crimes against children. Ninety percent. That is the standard. That is their record. That is the 
likelihood. Ninety percent.” 151 Cong. Rec. 7394 (2005). Unfortunately, “legislators rarely cite, nor 
are they asked for, the source and credibility of such figures.” Id. Human Rights Watch also reports 
that politicians often cite to sex offender recidivism rates of 80-90%. But most sex offenders do not 
commit sex offenses again after release from prison (three out of four do not re-offend). Further, most 
sex offenses are perpetrated by first-time offenders. Id.  
 181.  Patty Wetterling founded the Jacob Wetterling Foundation after her son’s abduction. 
Federal sex offender legislation was named after Jacob Wetterling (the Jacob Wetterling Crimes 
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, which required law enforcement 
to create and maintain a registry of convicted sex offenders). Id.  
182.  Id.  
 183.  Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Dr. Jill Levenson, professor of Human 
Services at Lynn University and national expert on sex offender management (October 31, 2006). Id. 
Dr. Levenson is a leading researcher in the field of sex offender recidivism.  
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recidivate.184 The Sixth Circuit made note of this in its Snyder decision.185 
Other types of offenders, such as those who had committed drug offenses 
and public-order offenses, have much higher re-arrest rates than sex 
offenders.186 Re-arrest rates for released rapists were 46%, and 41.4% for 
released offenders who had committed other sex offenses.187 Importantly, 
these rates indicated arrests for any type of offense—not just sex 
offenses.188 In fact, within three years, only 2.5% of released rapists were 
arrested for another rape.189 Further, only 5.3% of sex offenders were re-
arrested for a new sex offense—3.5% of whom were convicted for a new 
sex offense.190 
Higher rates of recidivism have been inaccurately reported, however. 
One prominent example, Lifetime Sex Offender Recidivism: A 25-Year 
Follow-up Study, found that sex offenders recidivated at a rate of 
88.3%.191 At first blush, this number seems to confirm the popular 
sentiment that sex offenders are compulsive recidivists. However, this 
study has been heavily criticized. In his comprehensive study titled Sex 
Offender Recidivism, Keith Soothill explained that the Lifetime Sex 
Offender study had a “serious sample selection bias” because it only 
examined a sample of “offenders referred for psychiatric assessment or 
treatment,” and those offenders could not “be considered as representative 
of all sex offenders.”192 Soothill also noted that this study’s findings have 
been deemed inapplicable because of this problem.193 
Findings like those in the Lifetime Sex Offender study—erroneous 
 184.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS., RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 1 (2003) 
(“[R]eleased prisoners with the lowest rearrest rates were those in prison for homicide (40.7%), rape 
(46.0%), other sexual assault (41.4%).”); RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON 
IN 1994, supra note 92, at 24 (reporting that sex offenders are less likely to recidivate than other 
criminals). 
 185.  Doe v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016) (“One study suggests that sex offenders (a 
category that includes a great diversity of criminals, not just pedophiles) are actually less likely to 
recidivate than other sorts of criminals.”). Id. at 700. 
 186.  RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, supra note 184, at 2 (“Property offenders 
had the highest rearrest rate, 73.8%; released drug offenders, 66.7%; and public-order offenders 
(mostly those in prison for driving while intoxicated or a weapons offense), a 62.2% rate.”). 
187.  Id. at 8. 
188.  Id. at 2. 
189.  Id. 
190.  RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994, supra note 92, at 24.  
191.  Ron Langevin et al., Lifetime Sex Offender Recidivism: A 25-Year Follow-up Study, 46(5) 
CANADIAN J. OF CRIM. JUST. 531-52 (2004). 
192.  Keith Soothill, Sex Offender Recidivism, 39 CRIME & JUST. 145, 158 (2010). 
 193.  Id. at 158 (quoting Cheryl M. Webster, Rosemary Gartner & Anthony N. Doob, Results by 
Design: The Artefactual Construction of High Recidivism Rates for Sex Offenders, 48(1) CANADIAN 
J. OF CRIM. JUST. 79 (2006) (“[T]his unusually high level is uninterpretable because the offenders 
whose criminal careers were followed are unlikely to be representative of sex offenders in general.”). 
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and inapplicable as they may be—present a very real perception problem 
for convicted sex offenders. Public interest in sex crimes has grown 
steadily in the past several decades, resulting in heightened media 
coverage of these crimes.194 As Soothill explains, inaccurate reports of 
high sex offender recidivism rates attract a great deal of media publicity 
because they seem to “confirm popular prejudices about the high 
recidivism rates of sex offenders.”195 And, unfortunately, “[p]ublic 
attitudes are molded in part by media representation. Media interest, in 
turn, partly explains the current discrepancy between public and 
professional perceptions of sex offending.”196 
The professional perception of sex offenses is that most sex offenses 
are committed by unregistered individuals, and that recidivism rates are 
actually very low.197 One of the most comprehensive studies on sex 
offender recidivism, which analyzed a sample of over 29,000 sex 
offenders, reported that 14% of all sex offenders would either be arrested 
or convicted for new sex offenses within four to six years of their 
release.198 This 14% recidivism rate is nothing to scoff at. But this 14% 
rate means also that, within four to six years after their release, 86% of 
sex offenders are not going to commit another sex offense. Another study 
by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction found that only 
8% of released sex offenders were re-incarcerated for committing another 
sex offense.199 And the view that sex offender recidivism rates are very 
 194.  Id. at 151 (“[T]he darker side of an increasing interest in child sex murder has been the 
media seeing much potential in exploiting the topic for marketing purposes.”). 
195.  Id. at 158. 
 196.  Id. at 151. See also Eileen K. Fry-Bowers, Controversy and Consequence in California: 
Choosing Between Children and the Constitution, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 889 (2004) (“Megan, Jacob, 
Samantha—their names are forever memorialized in newspaper headlines, while the circumstances 
surrounding their deaths provoked fear and anger in members of the public, particularly parents.”). 
197.  SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS, supra note 162 (indicating that, of all individuals arrested 
for sex crimes, 87% had not previously been convicted of a sex offense). 
 198.  Andrew Harris & R. Karl Hanson, Sex Offender Recidivism: A Simple Question, PUBLIC 
SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CANADA 3-7 (2004). This study reviewed data from ten 
other follow-up studies. The studies examined adult male sexual offenders from the United States, 
United Kingdom, and Canada.  
 199.  David A. Singleton, What is Punishment?: The Case for Considering Public Opinion 
Under Mendoza-Martinez, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 435, 453 (2015) (citing OHIO DEP’T OF REHAB. 
& CORR., TEN-YEAR RECIDIVISM FOLLOW-UP OF 1989 SEX OFFENDER RELEASES 10 (2001), 
http://www.drc.state.oh.us/web/reports/ten_year_ recidivism.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9Y3-FCHM] 
(explaining that a sexually related parole violation includes actions such as possession of 
pornography)). See also Anthony J. Petrosino & Carolyn Petrosino, The Public Safety Potential of 
Megan’s Law in Massachusetts: An Assessment from a Sample of Criminal Sexual Psychopaths, 45 
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 140, 150 (1999) (finding that, of the 136 new sex crimes that occurred in 
a specific jurisdiction in Massachusetts, only 12 stranger-predatory offenses were committed by 
registered or registry-eligible sex offenders). 
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low has been expressed often in the scholarly legal commentary on this 
subject.200 
While a review of these numbers may be a rather dry exercise, the 
numbers clearly illustrate a common theme: based on available data, the 
likelihood of released sex offenders committing additional sex crimes is 
very low. 
VI. EMPIRICAL DATA SHOWS THAT OFFENSE-BASED PUBLIC
REGISTRATION HAS, AT BEST, NO IMPACT ON RECIDIVISM 
In light of the very low rates at which sex offenders recidivate, courts 
and legislators may be tempted to conclude that SORAs are actually 
achieving their professed, non-punitive purpose.  But such a conclusion 
would be contrary to the available empirical data on the subject. A careful 
examination of the available data shows that 1) sex offender recidivism 
rates have not declined meaningfully since the enactment of modern 
SORAs; 2) that offense-based public registration has, at best, no impact 
on recidivism; and 3) that recent data indicates that offense-based public 
registration may even cause recidivism by exacerbating risk factors. 
A. The Federal Courts Have Not Questioned the Validity of the Belief 
That Expansive, Offense-Based Restrictions on Sex Offenders Will 
Reduce Recidivism Rates 
As with the supposedly “frightening and high” recidivism rates of 
sex offenders, the federal courts have also not questioned whether SORAs 
actually serve their intended purpose of reducing recidivism. The 
assumption that SORAs reduce recidivism is relevant to two of the 
Mendoza-Martinez factors: 1) whether a SORA has a rational relation to 
a non-punitive purpose; and 2) whether a SORA is excessive in relation 
to that purpose.201 The stated purpose of SORAs is to promote public 
 200.  See Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic Perspective on Megan’s 
Laws, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355, 383 (2005) (“[A]ccording to some studies, sex offenders actually 
have lower recidivism rates than other groups of offenders.”); Abril R. Bedarf, Examining Sex 
Offender Community Notification Laws,  83 CAL. L. REV. 885, 896 (1995) (“[S]ex offenders are not 
more likely than other criminals to be recidivists.”); Leonore M. J. Simon, An Examination of the 
Assumptions of Specialization, Mental Disorder, and Dangerousness in Sex Offenders, 18 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 275, 301 (2000) (“[W]hat is clear is that there is no empirical evidence that predictions of 
future sex offenses based on convictions for past ones are accurate.”); and Fry-Bowers, supra note 
196, at 909-10 (“Although one episode of sexual assault is intolerable, it is noteworthy that recidivism 
rates for sex offenders are lower, in comparison to the general criminal population, a fact that clearly 
undermines legislative assertions that public notification is ‘necessary and compelling’ because sex 
offenders have a high risk of re-offending.”) (internal citation omitted). 
201.  See generally Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
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safety by reducing recidivism.202 Thus, if recidivism rates are high—as 
the courts have assumed they are—then a law that allows law enforcement 
and the public to carefully monitor sex offenders must be rationally 
related to the purpose of recidivism reduction.203 And as long as that law 
does, in fact, reduce recidivism, then it is likely not excessive in relation 
to its purpose, because the constitutionality of the law does not hinge on 
whether it is “narrowly drawn to accomplish [its] stated purpose.”204 But 
if the stated purpose of SORAs—reduction of high sex offender 
recidivism rates—rests on a false premise, then even a SORA that is 
narrowly drawn becomes excessive. Stated differently, a law cannot be 
validly created to accomplish an invalid purpose. 
Since the Smith decision, all of the federal appeals courts have heard 
ex post facto challenges to SORAs and have found that the statutes had a 
rational connection to a non-punitive purpose and were not excessive in 
relation to that purpose.205 The First Circuit entertained such a challenge, 
but because it assumed the existence of high rates of recidivism, it 
followed that laws requiring sex offenders to register and to alert the 
public as to their status and location would reduce recidivism.206 In its 
analysis, the First Circuit did not examine any data regarding whether 
SORAs actually reduce recidivism; that belief was assumed.207 This is not 
surprising, however. Sex offender registration laws would not be enacted 
if their proponents did not believe that the laws would achieve their 
professed purpose of recidivism reduction.208 
 202.  In Smith, the Court noted that the Alaska legislature found that sex offenders recidivate at 
high rates, “and identified ‘protecting the public from sex offenders’ as the ‘primary governmental 
interest’ of the law.” Id. at 93. In Snyder, the court noted that the Michigan legislature’s stated purpose 
for enacting its SORA was to “better assist law enforcement officers and the people of this state in 
preventing and protecting against the commission of future criminal sexual acts by convicted sex 
offenders.” Doe v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 700 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 203.  Smith, 538 U.S. at 103 (“Alaska could conclude that a conviction for a sex offense provides 
evidence of substantial risk of recidivism. The legislature’s findings are consistent with grave 
concerns over the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex offenders and their dangerousness as 
a class. The risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is ‘frightening and high.’”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
204.  Id. at 102-03. 
205.  See supra note 32. 
206.  United States v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that public dissemination of 
sex offender registry data was not excessive, but was reasonable in light of the non-punitive objective 
of the SORA). 
 207.  The stated purpose of the SORA in this case was “to protect the public from sex offenders 
and offenders against children . . . [by] establish[ing] a comprehensive national system for the 
registration of those offenders.” 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2012). Parks, 698 F.3d at 5. Inherent in that 
purpose statement was the assumption that the laws would effectively achieve that purpose. Indeed, 
that was the very reason for passing the law.   
208.  When signing the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, President Bush 
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The other federal circuit courts have similarly rejected challenges to 
state SORAs without questioning whether the SORAs could actually 
achieve their stated purpose. The Second Circuit, in support of its holding 
that New York’s SORA’s registration requirement amendments were 
regulatory and not punitive, accepted—without question—that 
“registration . . . serves the general goal of protecting members of the 
public from the potential dangers posed by convicted sex offenders.”209 In 
Doe v. Bredesen, the Sixth Circuit (prior to its Snyder decision) wrapped 
up its analysis of Tennessee’s SORA’s rational relation to a non-punitive 
purpose with its analysis of the excessiveness of the SORA. The court 
stated that because the high recidivism rates of sex offenders were 
undisputed, “the Tennessee General Assembly could rationally conclude 
that sex offenders present an unusually high risk of recidivism, and that 
stringent registration, reporting, and electronic surveillance requirements 
can reduce that risk and thereby protect the public without further 
‘punishing’ the offenders.”210 Thus, the Bredesen court’s assumption that 
sex offender registries would reduce recidivism rested heavily on the 
assumption that recidivism rates were actually very high. Many other 
circuits have simply relied on Smith’s analysis to support the inference 
that sex offender registries reduce recidivism.211 
B. Empirical Data Shows That Registration and Notification Laws 
Either Have No Impact on Recidivism Rates, or Instead Cause 
explained that: 
The bill I sign today will greatly expand the National Sex Offender Registry by integrating 
the information in State sex offender registry systems and ensuring that law enforcement 
has access to the same information across the United States. It seems to make sense, 
doesn’t it? . . . Data drawn from this comprehensive registry will also be made available 
to the public so parents have the information they need to protect their children from sex 
offenders that might be in their neighborhoods. 
Remarks on Signing the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 1395, 1396 (July 27, 2006). 
 209.  Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105, 112-15 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding New York’s SORA to be 
non-punitive and constitutional). 
 210.  Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1006 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding Tennessee’s SORA to be 
non-punitive and constitutional). 
 211.  See Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 934-37 (7th Cir. 2016) (concluding that recidivism rates 
were high, despite examining data to the contrary, and ultimately assuming that registries reduce 
recidivism); Riley v. Corbett, 622 F. App’x 93, 95 (3d Cir. 2015) (finding that the provisions of 
Pennsylvania’s SORA were not materially different from the provisions of Alaska’s SORA and, 
therefore, were not punitive in effect); United States v. Shannon, 511 F. App’x 487, 492 (6th Cir. 
2013) (“[The Adam Walsh Act’s] regulatory purpose and the means used to achieve it is not materially 
different from that of the Alaska statute in [Smith].”); and Steward v. Folz 190 F. App’x 476, 478 (7th 
Cir. 2006) (relying on Smith to support its brief analysis of the constitutionality of Indiana’s SORA, 
concluding that the SORA was not punitive). 
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Recidivism Rates to Increase 
Although Congress and state legislatures, as well as the federal 
courts, have accepted—as fact—the assumption that SORAs reduce 
recidivism rates, empirical studies have not supported this assumption. 
SORAs do not reduce recidivism, and, therefore, do not protect the public. 
These laws do, however, impact the public’s perception of sex offenders 
in a manner that negatively impacts these sex offenders’ lives and makes 
them more likely to recidivate. 
A major justification for SORAs is that, once sex offenders 
understand that they are being monitored by the public, they will be 
discouraged from committing additional sex offenses.212 This justification 
is unsupported by empirical data. As noted in a leading study on this topic, 
early research on the effectiveness of SORAs found no “statistically 
significant” reduction in recidivism rates of sex offenders after the 
enactment of SORAs.213 More recently conducted research has found 
“little evidence that [SORAs] have had any meaningful influence on the 
overall number of sex offenses.”214 
 212.  An additional, related justification for SORAs—particularly their notification provisions—
is that these laws will motivate the public to take preventative action once they have been informed 
of the presence of sex offenders in their communities. A recent study notes that “[t]he logic behind 
these laws is that by providing the public with information about a potential threat to safety, citizens 
will be motivated to take protective actions to mitigate their risk for victimization.” Rachel Bandy, 
Measuring the Impact of Sex Offender Notification on Community Adoption of Protective Behaviors, 
10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 237 (2011). Yet this study, as well as others, found that the public 
generally does not take protective action once they have been notified of a potential threat posed by 
a sex offender in their community. Specifically, the study reported that it “did not discover any 
significant relationship between notification and self-protective behaviors, nor did the research of 
[Amy L. Anderson and Lisa L. Sample, Public Awareness and Action Resulting from Sex Offender 
Notification Laws, 19 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 371-96 (2008)], [Beck, Victoria Simpson and 
Lawrence F. Travis, Sex Offender Notification and Protective Behavior, 19 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 
289-302 (2004)], or [Alicia A. Caputo and Stanley L. Brodsky, Citizen Coping with Community 
Notification of Released Sex Offenders, 22 BEHAV. SCIENCES AND THE LAW 239–52 (2004)].” Id. at 
256. In fact, even parents of children were found to take only minimal precautions once they had been 
notified of the presence of sex offenders in their communities. Id.  
 213.  Prescott & Rockoff, supra note 93, at 162-63. “The first studies that sought to measure the 
impact of registration and notification laws compared the recidivism rates of offenders released just 
before and after registration and notification laws became effective in Iowa and Washington (Schram 
and Milloy 1995; Adkins, Huff, and Stageberg 2000) . . . [but] neither study found a statistically 
significant difference in the frequency of subsequent arrests for sex offenses between these two 
groups.” Prescott and Rockoff acknowledged, however, that those two studies relied on relatively 
small sample sizes. Id. at 162. 
 214.  Id. at 163. “More recent studies examine the relationship between the timing of legislation 
and changes in the annual frequency of sex offenses across states, using data from the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program (Shao and Li 2006; Agan 2007; 
Vasquez, Maddan, and Walker 2008),” and concluding that these studies, when considered together, 
show that SORAs have not had a meaningful impact on sex offender recidivism rates. Id.  
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Another study, conducted in 2011, found “little evidence to support 
the effectiveness of sex offender registries, either in practice or in 
potential.”215 This study first examined recidivism rates of sex offenders 
both before and after enactment of SORAs in individual states.216 The 
study found that states that implemented publicly-accessible sex offender 
registries did not see a reduction in sex offender recidivism after the 
registries were implemented.217 The study also compared recidivism rates 
of sex offenders who were released into states with sex offender registries 
to sex offenders released into states without registries.218 Again, sex 
offenders did not recidivate less when released into states with sex 
offender registries—if anything they recidivated at higher rates when they 
were required to register.219 Lastly, the study examined population blocks 
with greater concentrations of sex offenders to see if higher numbers of 
sex offenders in a given population area corresponded to higher rates of 
sex crimes.220 However, “[t]he results show that knowing where a sex 
offender lives does not reveal much about where sex crimes, or other 
crimes, will take place.”221 These findings undermine the justification for 
creating sex offender registries in the first place because they show that 
SORAs are not achieving their professed purpose of recidivism reduction. 
In support of its decision that Michigan’s SORA was 
unconstitutional, the Snyder court relied on another sophisticated study 
that compared the recidivism rates of sex offenders before the enactment 
of SORAs to recidivism rates after enactment.222 To ensure accurate 
results, the researchers bifurcated their analysis, examining the effects of 
registration provisions of SORAs separately from the effects of 
notification provisions.223 After the enactment of both registration and 
notification provisions, reported sex offenses did decline overall.224 
However, recidivism rates did not decline as a result of either registration 
or notification laws.225 In fact, the notification provisions of SORAs led 
 215.  Amanda Y. Agan, Sex Offender Registries: Fear Without Function?, 54 J. L. & ECON. 207, 
208 (2011). 
216.  Id. at 208. 
217.  Id. at 208, 222-23. 
218.  Id. at 208. 
219.  Id. at 208, 229. 
220.  Id. at 208-09. 
221.  Id. at 233. 
222.  Prescott & Rockoff, supra note 93, at 162.  
223.  Id. at 163. 
224.  Id. at 192 (explaining that registration did slightly reduce the frequency of reported sex 
offenses, but only offenses against local victims; registration laws did not correlate with any change 
in sex offenses against strangers). 
225.  Id. (explaining that, while registration and notification laws did appear to reduce crime, 
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to an increase in recidivism rates of registered sex offenders, likely 
because such provisions exacerbate recidivism risk factors.226 When a 
notification provision was implemented as part of a sex offender registry, 
recidivism increased by 1.57%.227 The study opined that the increase was 
likely due to “the social and financial costs associated with the public 
release of [sex offenders’] criminal history and personal information.”228 
Indeed, SORAs have significant, measurable negative impacts on the 
lives of sex offenders,229 particularly on their ability to obtain 
employment. Many SORAs—including Michigan’s—expressly restrict 
employment opportunities for sex offenders.230 However, the stigma that 
accompanies the sex-offender label often eliminates employment 
opportunities, even when statutory provisions do not expressly prohibit 
employment. 
The United States Department of Justice notes that “[m]any 
employers are reluctant to hire sex offenders because of the stigma that 
follows them, and most sex offenders are restricted by special conditions 
of their supervision.”231 It is well known that released criminals have 
greater difficulty finding jobs than individuals without criminal records. 
And “research on recidivism of the general criminal population [has] 
identified a history of unstable employment as one of the factors that 
consistently is associated with subsequent criminal behavior.”232 Sex 
offenders not only have criminal records, but they also have the stigma 
they only did so by deterring non-registered (i.e., new) offenders). 
 226.  Id. at 164, 192 (“Importantly, we detect no evidence that notification laws (as opposed to 
registration laws) curtail crime by reducing recidivism among convicted sex offenders; the estimated 
effect of notification is actually weaker when a state applies the law to a large number.”). 
227.  Id. at 192. 
228.  Id. 
229.  See Stephanie N.K. Robbins, Homelessness Among Sex Offenders: A Case for Restricted 
Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 205, 221 (2010). The 
collateral consequences that accompany sex-offender status are numerous, including not only 
stigmatization, but also legally mandated consequences, such as “disenfranchisement, employment 
restrictions or prohibitions, loss of ability to possess a firearm, deportation,” or consequences that are 
“social in nature (stigmatization, family ostracism, loss of housing, financial losses, etc.).” Id. 
(quoting Richard Tewksbury, Collateral Consequences of Sex Offender Registration, 21 J. CONTEMP. 
CRIM. JUST. 67, 68-69 (2005)). This Article further explained that “[c]ollateral consequences are 
problematic because they may aggravate ‘risk factors for recidivism such as lifestyle instability, 
negative moods, and lack of positive social support.’” Id. (quoting Jill S. Levenson et al., Megan’s 
Law and Its Impact on Community Re-Entry for Sex Offenders, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 587, 590 (2007)). 
 230.  See 2005 Mich. Pub. Acts 121, 127 (prohibiting registered sex offenders from living, 
loitering, or working within 1,000 feet of a school) (emphasis added). 
 231.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., TIME TO WORK: MANAGING THE 
EMP. OF SEX OFFENDERS UNDER COMMUNITY SUPERVISION 1 (2002). 
 232.  Id. (citing P. Gendreau, T. Little & C. Goggin, A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult 
Criminal Recidivism: What Works, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575-607 (1996)). 
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that accompanies their sex-offender status, which makes it even more 
difficult for sex offenders to secure employment.233 Yet, several empirical 
studies have shown that stable employment directly correlates to 
decreased recidivism.234 One study found that sex offenders who 
committed multiple sex offenses had more difficulty finding employment 
than those with fewer sex offenses.235 The Justice Department also noted 
that, according to another study, “the only factors associated with reduced 
re-offending among sex offenders were the combination of stable 
employment and sex offender treatment.”236 This research indicates that 
stable employment can significantly mitigate a sex offender’s risk of re-
offense. Yet, SORAs are doing the opposite—they are exacerbating 
recidivism risk factors by erecting barriers to employment. 
While SORAs have not been shown to reduce recidivism of sex 
offenders, these laws have been shown to have significant negative 
impacts on the lives of sex offenders. However, despite the lack of 
empirical support for the conclusion that SORAs reduce recidivism, 
legislatures continue to consider legislation that would more severely 
burden convicted sex offenders, without any meaningful indication that 
those restrictions will reduce recidivism.237 
VII. CONCLUSION
The assumptions that SORAs have been built on are just that—
assumptions. But those assumptions are belied by the facts: sex offenders 
do not recidivate at frightening and high rates, and registration and 
notification laws do not decrease recidivism. Once this is understood, the 
233.  Id.  
234.  Id. at 2. 
235.  Id. (citing R.K. HANSON AND A. HARRIS, DEP’T OF THE SOLICITOR GEN. OF CANADA, 
DYNAMIC PREDICTORS OF SEXUAL RECIDIVISM (1998)). 
 236.  Id. (citing C. Kruttschnitt, C. Uggen & K. Shelton, Predictors of Desistance Among Sex 
Offenders: The Interactions of Formal and Informal Social Controls, 17 JUSTICE QUARTERLY 61, 
61–87 (2000) (finding that sex offenders with stable employment at the time of their sentencing were 
37% less likely to be convicted for a subsequent sex offense than sex offenders with unstable work 
histories)). 
237.  Prescott & Rockoff, supra note 93, at 161, 192-93. The authors concluded by stating that: 
The lack of empirical evidence for the recidivism-reducing benefits of registration and 
notification has not stopped policy makers from imposing additional restrictions on con-
victed sex offenders. Registration and notification laws are now, in some sense, old tech-
nology. Today, states are in the midst of imposing even more intrusive laws, such as resi-
dency restrictions and civil commitment, with fresh hope of reducing recidivism. These 
policies may impose even higher costs on sex offenders and their families than registration 
and notification laws have, and research is needed to understand if the effects, if any, of 
these policies on criminal behavior makes these investments worthwhile.  
Id. 
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rational connection of SORAs to the purpose of reducing recidivism no 
longer exists; it is not rational to attempt to fix a non-existent problem by 
adopting a solution that does not work. Absent a connection to a non-
punitive purpose, and in light of the fact that registration for sex offenders 
is usually triggered by nothing more than a conviction, sex offender 
registration laws such as those in Snyder must be considered punitive. 
Currently, state SORAs impose retroactive punishment on an incredibly 
broad class of people—the majority of whom will never commit another 
sex offense. SORAs are not accomplishing their noble goal of protecting 
the vulnerable from dangerous sexual predators. As Human Rights Watch 
opined, “[i]f sex offender registries were limited to previously convicted 
sex offenders who had committed sexually violent crimes or sex crimes 
against children and who have been individually assessed as presenting a 
high or medium risk of committing similar crimes again, registration 
might help protect the public.”238 But SORAs are neither limited nor 
individualized. As a result, they do not effectively protect the public. 
If the federal courts will accept that recidivism rates are not 
frighteningly high and that SORAs do not reduce recidivism, then a 
rational connection to a non-punitive purpose will not be present. The 
most heavily-weighted Mendoza-Martinez factor would then weigh 
toward a finding that SORAs are punitive in effect. And once the courts 
acknowledge that the expansive restrictions SORAs impose are not 
counter-balanced by any proven, positive effects—that they are not 
reducing recidivism—then the SORAs must also be considered excessive. 
Two Mendoza-Martinez factors now weigh toward finding SORAs 
punitive. Lastly, many of the circuit courts that have heard challenges to 
SORAs have admitted that SORAs promote the traditional aims of 
punishment—retribution and deterrence. Thus, the balance has tipped, as 
three out of the five pertinent Mendoza-Martinez factors, including the 
most heavily-weighted factor, favor finding SORAs punitive. 
These factors provide the framework for determining whether a law 
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. But these factors should not be applied 
in a rigid, concrete manner—they are guidelines, not inflexible mandates. 
Judges should employ a holistic approach when analyzing these factors, 
considering the overall purposes and effects of SORAs when determining 
whether the laws are constitutional. Thus, the judicial analysis of 
challenges to the constitutionality of SORAs ought to be based “on a sure 
understanding of the scientific . . . complexities, factual rather than legal, 
 238.  No Easy Answers, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 11, 2007), https://www.hrw.org/
report/2007 /09/11/no-easy-answers/sex-offender-laws-us#730a8b [https://perma.cc/X86A-WV6C]. 
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out of which the cases arise.”239 But the factual understanding upon which 
these laws rest is not well understood. As Judge Posner asserted, rules and 
statutes “are merely particular responses to particular states of fact 
(assumed to be true whether or not they are). The law is, and I dare say 
always will be, ad hoc and ad hominem to a fault.”240 The danger posed 
by “sex offenders” has been overstated. This overstatement has led to 
overly-broad and ineffective legislative responses. The science and data 
now available show that those responses were inappropriate. 
Thus, civil regulatory laws enacted under misapprehensions fueled 
by “those sudden and strong passions to which men are exposed” should 
now be acknowledged as the punitive measures that they truly are.241 
When faced with actual data reporting how infrequently sex offenders 
recidivate, even Patty Wetterling was forced to “rethink the value of 
broad-based community notification laws.”242 The federal courts should 
rethink them, too.243 The courts should follow the example the Sixth 
Circuit set in its Snyder decision and protect the rights of United States’ 
residents, like Virgil McCranie, to be free from ex post facto punishment. 
239.  POSNER, supra note 149, at 4. 
 240.  Id. at 7 (quoting Grant Gilmore, Products Liability: A Commentary, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 
108 (1970)). 
241.  See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 138 (1810).  
242.  No Easy Answers, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 11, 2007), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/09/11/no-easy-answers/sex-offender-laws-us#730a8b 
[https://perma.cc/NVN3-J46J]. 
 243.  The Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Snyder was appealed by the State of Michigan to the Supreme 
Court of the United States on December 14, 2016. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Richard 
Snyder, et. al., v. John Does #1-5, et. al., No. 16-768, 2017 WL 4339925. The respondents, John Does 
#1-5, filed an opposition brief on February 16, 2017. See Brief in Opposition, Richard Snyder, et. al., 
v. John Does #1-5, et. al., No. 16-768, 2017 WL 4339925. The Supreme Court ultimately declined to 
hear the case on October 2, 2017.  
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